Hobbes' 'Of Libertie and Necessitie'

7 Annotations

First Reading

vicente  •  Link

Hobbes Liberty and Necessity,”
21: 4
Leviathan
The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil
By Thomas Hobbes, Published April 1651

http://web.archive.org/web/200410…

[Broken link replaced with an Internet Archive link, 8 May 2014. P.G.]

Second Reading

Terry Foreman  •  Link

The questions concerning liberty, necessity, and chance clearly stated and debated between Dr. Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury [in a letter To the Right Honourable the Marquis of NEWCASTLE]..
Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679., Bramhall, John, 1594-1663.
London: Printed for Andrew Crook ..., 1656.
Early English Books Online [full text]
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/…

Third Reading

San Diego Sarah  •  Link

Vicente and P.G.'s link above takes you to this dense document, which Pepys describes as "a very shrewd piece":
He probably picked up on this one-sided 'dialog' about impressment and service due to the sovereign:

(¶ 21.11) [Margin: Subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies even against them that lawfully invade them]
First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of every one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest that every subject has liberty in all those things the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shown before, in the 14th Chapter, that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void. Therefore,

(¶ 21.12) [Margin: Are not bound to hurt themselves]
If the sovereign command a man, though justly condemned, to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.

(¶ 21.13) If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it; because no man, as I have shown in the same chapter, can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.

(¶ 21.14) Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words, "I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions"; in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, "Kill me, or my fellow, if you please"; another thing to say, "I will kill myself, or my fellow." It followeth, therefore, that

(¶ 21.15) No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention; which is to be understood by the end thereof. When therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise, there is.

San Diego Sarah  •  Link

PART 2

(¶ 21.16) [Margin: Nor to warfare, unless they voluntarily undertake it]
Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy, though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, may nevertheless in many cases refuse, without injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Commonwealth. And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness, not only to women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected), but also to men of feminine courage.
When armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of treachery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoid battle is not injustice, but cowardice.
But he that enrolleth himself a soldier, or taketh impressed money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature, and is obliged, not only to go to the battle, but also not to run from it without his captain's leave. And when the defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain.

(¶ 21.17) To resist the sword of the Commonwealth in defence of another man, guilty or innocent, no man hath liberty; because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us, and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government. But in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly, or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the liberty then to join together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: for they but defend their lives, which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent. There was injustice in the first breach of their duty: their bearing of arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be only to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.

(¶ 21.18) [Margin: The Greatest Liberty of Subjects, depends on the silence of the Law]
As for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less; and in some times more, in other times less, according as they that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient.

San Diego Sarah  •  Link

CONCLUSION:

As for example, there was a time when in England a man might enter into his own land, and dispossess such as wrongfully possessed it, by force. But in after times that liberty of forcible entry was taken away by a statute made by the king in Parliament.
And in some places of the world men have the liberty of many wives: in other places, such liberty is not allowed. ...

LATER:

(¶ 21.21) [Margin: In what Cases Subjects are absolved of their obedience to the subject]
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished.
The sovereignty is the soul of the Commonwealth; which, once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it.
The end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own or in another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortal; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death by foreign war, but also through the ignorance and passions of men it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a natural mortality, by intestine discord. ...

There's lots more. Not exactly bedside reading, which may account for Pepys only admitting to reading it once.

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References

Chart showing the number of references in each month of the diary’s entries.

1661