Nathaniel Fiennes MP was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II. For an understanding of why Fiennes did not find favor after the Restoration, see https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II. For an understanding of how Broghill played his cards and found favor and advancement after that Restoration, see https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
Chief Justice Oliver St.John was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II. For an understanding of why St.John did not find favor after that Restoration, see https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
"No, Kevin Peter, this was Charles II's first outing as a healer." What was I thinking? Maybe it was Charles' first time IN ENGLAND. He has been a bit busy. Also minting all those gold Angels might have been a challenge.
"... did SP missed this piece of popish (laying of hands) history." And yes, Vincent, Pepys didn't record that and nearly everything else the Stuart brothers were up to at this time -- he's too consumed by his own concerns and activities to be a Royalty follower as well. We have to leave that up to Evelyn, who is still a smitten Monarchist at this time.
When Charles II was restored on 8 May, it was done easily and unconditionally. Most of the monarchical Cromwellians had accepted the idea of the Stuart restoration, and had influenced it.
This acceptance represented more of a pragmatic resignation than an ideological commitment, even on the part of those who corresponded with Charles. Their experience of the civil wars had left them with a mistrust of kingship, and their admiration of Oliver Cromwell left them with high expectations of a monarch grounded in superior behavior, not a divine right to rule.
As Montagu observed: … the King would not last long ‘unless he carry himself very soberly and well’.
Examining the monarchical Cromwellians’ relationship with the exiled court reveals some conclusions: It reinforces the monarchical Cromwellians’ position at the center of government and their influence, particularly under the Protectorate.
Hyde’s instructions reveal the importance he placed on securing them to the royalist cause, while his agents’ obsession with St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint rescued them from the obscurity into which their own attempts to distance themselves from the Protectorate at the Restoration cast them.
"Whitewashing" disguised the monarchical Cromwellians’ commitment to the Protectorate and to the Cromwell family -– made possible only by Richard’s actions releasing them from their bond to him -– and by Hyde and Charles II’s acknowledgement of their former loyalty.
The key to many of the monarchical Cromwellians’ views was their desire for a monarchical settlement, and this made them willing converts to the King’s cause. The finer points of their conversion –- its tone and timing -– cast long shadows over their future careers.
Those, like Montagu, Monck and Broghill, who negotiated their relationship with the exiled court well, enjoyed royal favor, while those who, like Thurloe, St.John and Pierrepoint, resisted the Restoration for too long never regained their public positions.
Age and utility may have also played a part, with the younger members able to distance themselves from the civil wars, and to promise decades of loyal service to the new King than their older colleagues.
The range of success with which the monarchical Cromwellians’ loyal submissions were received at the Restoration reflected the royalists’ dealings with them during the preceding year.
Those Cromwellians whom the exiled court found as hostile obstacles to the Restoration were damaged for life. ‘Without doubt’, an agent wrote to Hyde of St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint on 13 May 1660, ‘there are not in nature 3 such beasts, from whose villainy and treachery I beseech God defend His Majesty’.
The contrast between this vitriol and Hyde’s desires a year earlier that his agents secure the services of these same men, shows the price the monarchical Cromwellians paid for the choices they made in those 12 months.
It was not for nothing that another informant declared St.John to be ‘the most deadly enemy the King has in England’.
It was unfortunate for St.John that his actions were so closely watched as he was not the only monarchical Cromwellian working to prevent a Stuart restoration.
Broghill, while corresponding with the royal court on the one hand, continued ostensibly to work with Thurloe against a royal return until late April. He wrote to the Secretary, partially in code, assuring him: ‘They have had odd plots 6 29 32 40 39 6 here concerning the king, and all means used to win me; and thos failinge, other things were thought on; but I can assure you, I has intirely secured Munster 38 17 16 5 81 against any, that shall be for the king, or not for the council of state or parliament’.58 58 Lord Broghill to John Thurloe, 24 April 1660, in A collection of the state papers of John Thurloe, Esq; secretary, first, to the Council of State, and afterwards to the two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, ed. T. Birch (7 vols., 1742), VII, 908. There is no evidence anyone has broken this cipher yet.
By this stage, what the monarchical Cromwellians feared most was that Monck would restore Charles II without sufficient conditions.
Whitelocke was one of the first to guess Monck’s true intentions and it was because of this that he urged Charles Fleetwood either to bid to control the King’s restoration or else to oppose it militarily.
When Fleetwood eventually refused to do either, Whitelocke rightly observed: ‘… you will ruin yourself and your friends’.
Broghill expressed similar concerns to Thurloe, writing: ‘We all hope thosE precious rights we have so long, and we think justly contended for, will not be exposed, but provided for’.
Montagu, for his part, entertained suspicions that Monck was aiming at his own dictatorship.
Hyde refused to believe that Monck’s colleagues had guessed Monck’s true intentions: ‘It is not possible that Pierpoint and St.John would be so impertinently violent against the King, if they believed Monck would ever be wrought over to him’.
Generally, Hyde’s informants were unconcerned, as one wrote: ‘Thurloe is not much in use, and his good old Master [Oliver St.John], after his lost hopes, is returned to keep his cushion till Wednesday morning. Pierpoint is still inveterate’.
Montagu certainly knew about the plan, for he confided in Pepys ‘that there was great endeavors to bring in the Protector again’. However, the fact that Montagu told Pepys that he thought the enterprise unlikely to succeed suggests that he was not involved in the plot. This is the most convincing piece of evidence to suggest that the other monarchical Cromwellians were launching a last-ditch attempt to restore Richard.
Rumors were circulated widely, as Pepys recounted aboard Montagu’s flagship 4 days earlier: ‘Great is the talk of a single person, and that it would now be Charles, George or Richard again. For the last of which, my Lord St.Johns is said to speak high’.
Montagu’s prediction proved right, and the plan to restore Richard came to nothing. Most Cromwellians soon abandoned the plot, as Hyde heard on 9 March: ‘Last week there was great caballing to bring in Dick Cromwell by Thurloe, St.John, Montagu, & others, but that design proving too weak, St.John and Thurloe have this week assisted the Rump in formenting discontents amongst the Officers of the Army’.
Of all the monarchical Cromwellians, St.John seems to have been the most trenchant in his opposition to a Stuart restoration. While exploring the potential for Richard’s restoration in private, he worked tirelessly to safeguard the Commonwealth.
St.John displayed his true feelings at the turbulent first meeting of the new Council of State where Hyde’s informant told Hyde that ‘St.Johns and his party [are] for anything or person to be sett up but ye king’.
St.John was powerless to prevent the Restoration, and when his arguments fell on deaf ears he withdrew from the Council, speaking angrily of Monck’s conversion to the royal cause ‘that nothing troubled him more then that Monck was a Rigid Chavaleere, both he and his man Thurloe are oul at heels’.
Thurloe then was equally powerless.
In resisting the Restoration so passionately, St.John continued to confound all of Hyde’s expectations. His reasons for resisting the Restoration are likely to have been complex. He had always desired a monarchical settlement, but his personal hostility to the Stuart dynasty had a long history . The hostility was mutual. Over the months, Hyde received hysterical reports of St.John’s – and naturally Thurloe’s – activities in the most colorful language: ‘Thurloe is semper idem; but I hope his horns will never grow so long as formerly to push the King’s friends St.John is a great pike that’s loath to be beaten into the net. He & Thurloe have been labouring of late to blow up the sectarys and discontented officers, but I hope it will come to nothing’.
Once he had written this, Montagu considered himself bound in honor to Charles and it was on the following day that Pepys first noted Montagu’s having a ‘mind clear to bring in the king’.
Six days later Montagu told Pepys ‘his thoughts that the King would carry it, and that he did think himself very happy that he was now at sea, as well for his own sake as that he thought he might do his country some service in keeping things quiet’.
On 3 May, Montagu declared for Charles II and revealed to Pepys that ‘there hath been many letters sped between them for a great while’.
These successes boosted the royalists’ confidence to the point where they began to wonder why some other Cromwellians had not made contact. As Hyde wrote of Broghill: ‘… if Lord Broghill had that zeal of the King’s service, which some of his friends think him to have, or that entire confidence in Ned Villiers that he imagines, sure he would have sent an express to him in all this time, and not expected one from him’.
Despite Hyde’s anxieties, his informants continued to believe Broghill loyal, although they could only speculate as he still refused to speak openly of his commitment. Thus Hyde received word on 16 March: ‘No letters from Ireland these last two posts: Jones, Coote, and Broughill, are the chief actors there. Soe far as we understand they are all there disposed for the King’.
This silence may be explained by the pragmatism of the monarchical Cromwellians, many of whom continued to keep their options open. This is not to say the information Hyde received of their genuine interest in his cause was inaccurate –- it did have its attractions for them –- but to suggest they continued to explore other alternative courses of action; courses available to them only as long as they did not commit themselves fully and openly to one cause.
As set out above, reports reached Hyde as late as March 1660 that some monarchical Cromwellians were exploring a final attempt to restore Richard Cromwell.
Hyde would not believe this of his favorite Montagu, writing: ‘… some would persuade us that he [Montagu] is most desirous to set up Richard again, which is so ridiculous that I cannot believe it. I wish you would say somewhat to me of him, and whether he be again to go to sea’.
Thurloe made his move some time after resuming office. The evidence of Richard Willis (the double agent who served both Thurloe and Hyde), suggesting that Thurloe may have been in contact with the court the previous year, but Willis’ account must be regarded with caution as he used it to defend his traitorous behavior after the Restoration.
Thurloe certainly contacted Hyde in the spring of 1660, as Hyde told Sir John Grenville on 13 April that he had received overtures from him. He remained cautious, and would not submit any commitment in writing.
Hyde and Charles observed Thurloe’s apprehension with less sympathy than they accorded to Montagu. While they accepted Montagu’s reluctance to commit to their cause, they did not doubt his wish to do so. Regardless of his silence, they remained convinced of Montagu’s loyalty and were delighted when he appeared to have changed his mind about supporting Charles’ restoration.
It seems likely that Montagu was one of the first to come to the private decision that Charles II’s restoration would be the best available outcome, as reported by a royal agent: ‘Montagu has absolutely forsaken Thurloe, St.John and all that Cabal, and doth now wholly cleave to his father-in-law and his Party’.
Furthermore, the source reported Montagu to have said to a mutual friend that ‘the true reason why I left the one, and cleave to the other, is, because I plainly see, there is an utter impossibility of settlement without bringing in the King; and I professe, I had rather the Nation were settled, though I and my whole Family suffer by it, as I know I shall’.
Montagu’s tone seems more resigned than fervent; his acceptance of this course was a pragmatic rather than an ideological decision.
Montagu was careful to hold out as long as possible before agreeing to support Charles II and, when he did so, to keep his support utterly secret. We know from the Clarendon State Papers that Montagu was in contact with Charles in April 1660 through the mediation of a relation. Charles assured Montagu that he understood the delicate nature of his position: ‘I know too well the use you may be of to me in a good conjuncture, to expose you unnecessarily, and in an unfit season; therefore all that I desire of you is that you will give me your word, that you do and will take my business to heart’.
Charles promised Montagu not ‘to say anything of what hath been done in former times, in which I know well by what reasons and authority you were led, and I do assure you I am so far from remembering any thing to your disadvantage, that I look upon you as a person to be rewarded’.
Montagu was persuaded by this letter to respond favorably to Charles’ overtures on 10 April, 1660, assuring Charles that ‘I am unalterably a most dutiful subject and faithful servant of yours to the uttermost of my power’, adding that ‘the resolution I have fixedly taken, and shall never be cancelled’.
When Amb. Bordeaux had an audience with Nathaniel Fiennes ‘in order to ascertain whether any hope remained for the Protector’, he learned that Fiennes ‘blames his [Richard’s] conduct and compares it to that of Rehoboam’.
(Rehoboam, the son of Solomon who reigned after his father’s death, went against the counsel of his older advisers and increased the taxes upon his subjects who rebelled as a result and created the new Israel.) This suggests Fiennes also blamed Richard for ignoring the advice of his closest civilian advisers inherited from his father -– the monarchical Cromwellians.
Taken together, these considerations eased the monarchical Cromwellians’ consciences as they looked beyond the Cromwell family for other options available to them. It was natural for them to brood over such a ‘case of conscience’, surrounded as they were by debate everywhere: in the privacy of men’s homes, at the universities, and in the press.
Their need to reconcile themselves to such actions echoes through their later writings, but they also made their justifications clear at the time. On 16 December, 1659, the Secretary of the Sealed Knot, Allen Brodrick, reported that Monck had explained: ‘Richard Cromwell forsook himself else had I never failed my promise to his Father, or regard to his memory’.
Montagu agreed, as a Hyde informant reported: ‘[Montagu] told me lately in private … as others had accused him for treating with the King, & the like, but he valued his Honour more than all that Family; But if Richard had not so foolishly broken his Parliament both he & Monck would have stood by him; And this, so far as I know, is his true sence’.
Whitelocke also used this rational to Richard’s fall in his explanation to Broghill of his decision to work with the de facto military authorities in October 1659: ‘Whitelocke had resolved in his mind the present state of affairs, that there was no visible authority or power for government at this time, but that of the Army’.
The reasoning that in Richard’s absence they were absolved from their ties to him -– almost universal among the monarchical Cromwellians -– explains how, once the time was right, they felt able to respond to the royalist courtship.
Discussions between the exiled court and the monarchial Cromwellians really began in the early months of 1660.
Once the Rump had reassembled in December 1659 and, with Monck’s march to London and the return of the secluded members in February, those Cromwellians who had stayed away during the Republican interlude returned to London with renewed confidence: Thurloe was reinstated as Secretary of State in February; Montagu and Broghill returned to Parliament, Broghill as a Commissioner to rule Ireland; Pierrepoint and Montagu joined the Council of State; and Monck and Montagu became joint Generals at Sea.
From this power base the monarchical Cromwellians began to reassess their relationships with the exiled court.
Another agent wrote on 3 March 1660 that: ‘This is the first night that Thurloe sits in the Councel as Secretary of State: He, St.John, Montagu, and that Cabal have been of late finding a way to let Dick Cromwell in again’.
Montagu told Pepys 3 days later that ‘there was great endeavours to bring in the Protector again’. He went on to comment that ‘he did not believe it would last long if he were brought in’.
We do not know how long individual monarchical Cromwellians worked for Richard’s restitution. What can be understood is their feelings towards Richard and the Protectorate that had turned to dust in their hands.
The evidence above leaves little doubt that Richard’s Protectorate was the monarchical Cromwellians’ regime of choice. It was their strong commitment to both the Cromwell family and the Protectorate which fueled their efforts to prevent its collapse, their expressions of grief when it did so, and their continued desire for Richard’s return.
As Thurloe wrote to William Lockhart on Richard’s abdication in May 1659: ‘How this change doth afflict all of us here who had the honour to be related both to his Father and himself I need not trouble your Excellency with. I am in so much confusion that I can scarce constrain myself to write about it’.
However, the monarchical Cromwellians’ support for Richard diminished as the months wore on after his abdication. This did not represent a cooling in their affections for him and his family, but instead a lessening of their belief in his capabilities and in their ability to restore him (as evidenced in Thurloe’s reluctant negotiations with Amb. Bordeaux).
This accords with the pragmatism this group of politicians displayed throughout their political careers and which led at various points to their castigation as self-interested time-servers. There was also a strong sense among some of the monarchical Cromwellians that Richard had also failed to prevent his own fall.
After the Restoration, Montagu told Pepys ‘of the simplicity of the Protector in his losing all that his father had left him’. Montagu blamed Richard’s failure to listen to the counsel of the monarchical Cromwellians.
Hyde understood the monarchical Cromwellians would need a great deal of reassurance that Charles II would treat them kindly and reward them for their help in recognition of the great risks they would take on his behalf.
Despite this conciliatory attitude, correspondence with the exiled court remained one-sided and nothing came of Hyde’s agents’ negotiations.
In the summer of 1659, Hyde received a series of disappointing reports describing an apparent resurgence in Fifth Monarchism, Richard Cromwell’s diminishing importance and the monarchical Cromwellians’ withdrawal from the center of power.
Hyde made a final attempt to woo Richard in July, but his emissaries drew a blank when they visited him.
Hyde’s agents suggested St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint were opposed to such an alliance which, if true, may suggest they continued to believe Richard’s cause was salvageable and doubted they could ensure Charles' restored with appropriate conditions and safeguards for themselves or for the nation. Even if Hyde promised indemnity to them, he could not guarantee what a restored Long Parliament might choose to do.
It seems the monarchical Cromwellians continued to explore the viability of restoring Richard Cromwell for some time after his fall.
Both Hyde and the French ambassador Bordeaux reported these activities. The ambassador's correspondence records a series of negotiations between Bordeaux, Thurloe and Fiennes in May and June, 1659.
Acting on behalf of Cardinal Mazarin, Amb. Bordeaux initially approached Thurloe to pledge the support of French troops to restore Richard. Thurloe was unsure whether Richard had fallen too far into disgrace for his restoration to be achievable, and had misgivings about the consequences of failure.
The ambassador wrote that the Secretary agreed ‘that it would be an undertaking which would lead to his total ruin and to the ruin of his friends, and which might also be prejudicial to France, were it not successful’. This came to nothing, with Nathaniel Fiennes explaining later that Thurloe ‘was not a man to enter into any warlike designs, and that as Divine Providence had seen fit thus to dispose of the government of England, no other course remained open but submission’.
This account affords a glimpse into the precarious position in which Thurloe and his fellow monarchical Cromwellians found themselves. The restoration of Richard would undoubtedly have been the most desirable eventuality for them, and yet it was a considerable risk.
Reports of these designs reached Hyde as late as March 1660. ‘Various are the opinions, even of the wisest men’, wrote one informant, ‘whether there be not a combination between St.John, Pierpoint, Thurloe, Montagu, Phil Jones and others, to reinvest Richard Cromwell’.
Next Hyde targeted Cromwellians who held strategic military posts around the British Isles, including Henry Cromwell, Monck, Montagu and Broghill.
In a letter of June 1659, he set out his interpretation of their reluctant acceptance of the republican regime, and hopes for their conversion: “Truly if with reason and honesty we consult both [Henry and Monck], their best game lies that way: for neither upon their own score can keep possession, and by a submission here, both lost; which by a compliance with the right owner what hath power to make good what he promiseth a preservation to them selfs and their alliance may be obtained: The like game may Montagu play, beinge in the same predicament; which is feared all three will do; then assuredly our Idol, The good old cause falls eternally.”
Montagu was a focus for Hyde’s hopes, and he was approached as early as May 1659 with a letter from Charles II. In this, Charles wooed Montagu, writing: ‘it is very long since I have promised myself your intire affection and all the offices you can performe towards the restoring me to what is my right, and your Country to the happinesse it hath been so long deprived of’
Hyde approached Broghill through his agent, “Ned” Villiers, whom he told that the ‘King looks upon Lord Broghill as a person who may be most instrumental to do him service there, and he does not believe he will have any adverseness to it when the season shall be proper’.
On 20 June, 1659, Villiers was instructed that ‘the King very much desires… that you would haste into Ireland, and that you would assure Lord Broghill of all that he can wish for from the King, if he will perform this service’.
Charles Wolseley was another target: ‘If Sir Charles Wolseley be disposed’, Hyde wrote, ‘he can easily possess Stafford, which is no ill post, he may very securely depend upon his Majesty’.
In every case, Hyde’s correspondence reveals the understanding and sympathy he and his agents felt for the monarchical Cromwellians’ quandary.
In Montagu’s case, Hyde wrote years later of how Cromwell had charmed Montagu into his service and of how Montagu had been, understandably, ‘passionately adhered’ to him.
Hyde’s informants, working on Montagu, recognized this and also understood that Montagu had responsibilities at home; a great stake to be lost should he gamble on a Stuart restoration and lose.
As Samuel Morland wrote to Charles II on 15 June, 1659, ‘having understood your Matys great desire that Gratt: Montagu should quit that Jewish Party to wch he hath so long adhered, & become at length a faithfull & loyal subject’: “… he was wholly devoted to old Noll -– his countryman, & for his sake a great lover of all his family, but a perfect hater of the men yt now rule, as he has often told me privately … the trueth is he hath left behind him a very good stake; 2,000/, per annum, with a wife & 10 small children, & it’s no small matter will reward him for such a loss.”
To Hyde, St.John’s conversion was essential: ‘St.John is so considerable that I wish him well disposed’.
Often in Hyde’s correspondence, the triumvirate of St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint are given significance and influence.
As Hyde explained, he expected St.John, once he realized the ‘necessary of calling in the King’ to ‘press that all should be settled upon the old foundation… especially if he can draw his friends Pierpoint and Thurloe to the same concurrence, who have enough manifested that they are not enemies to a single person, and they can never be secure under any other than the right one, whom they would love if they knew’.
Hyde’s network considered the 3 men as central to the government of Richard’s Protectorate. As one agent wrote, ‘the present government is managed by St.John, Peirpoint, and Thurloe; what these resolve on in their Cabal is presented to the Council, and there confirmed’ while another reported Fauconbridge [Thomas Belasyse, 1st Earl of Fauconberg?] as saying that ‘Thurloe governs Cromwell, and St.John and Pierpoint govern Thurloe’.
Once this alliance was identified as the principal obstacle to Hyde’s advances to Richard Cromwell, Hyde instructed his agents to concentrate on either securing them to the royalist cause or sabotaging their power. This manifested itself in a variety of tactics: ‘We know Pierpoint is well, and that he will never be severed from St.John’, Hyde wrote, ‘but if he were once broke, the other would look about him, indeed if those two were out of the way, Cromwell himself would quickly find the only course to preserve his family… We have taken the best care we can that Pierpoint might be better disposed; but those who know him best, dare not approach him, till the other two are humbled; therefore I pray do all that may be to prosecute Mr. Thurloe and his Master, which will produce excellent effects.'
Despite initial reports that Morduant had secured a deal with Richard, nothing came of it, possibly due to Thurloe delaying the process and Richard getting cold feet.
For each man, these practical considerations were balanced by questions of conscience. Loyalty to the Protectorate and the Cromwell family weighed heavily on their minds, and their responses to the republican regime, exiled court and later writings demonstrate the lengths they went to justify –- both to themselves and to others –- that any change in allegiance did not entail the betrayal of a prior commitment or any consequent loss of honor.
Keith Thomas captured these struggles in his description of this time as the ‘age of conscience’. … ‘there has been no period in English history when men and women were subjected to so many religious and political conflicts of duty and allegiance or responded to them in so intensely scrupulous a fashion’.
No one was more aware of this complex political and emotional landscape than Edward Hyde. Writing to an agent about their plans to convert Montagu to the royalist cause in February 1660, Hyde mused: ‘I have no better opinion of the honesty of the age than you seem to have, and do not look that conscience and repentance shall dispose men to lose all they have got, yet how to apply a general remedy to that disease is above my skill in physic’.
Although Hyde could not think of a ‘general remedy’ to the problem of how to convert their former enemies, he recognized the importance that ‘care is taken that all be said that is necessary’ to reassure potential collaborators that they would be safe from retribution.
In the months around Richard’s abdication, Hyde instructed his informants to work on the monarchical Cromwellians, seeking ways to win them over to the royalist cause.
First Hyde tried to reach a settlement with Richard Cromwell through his agent John Mordaunt but, to his surprise, the long-standing partnership of Thurloe and St.John proved an insurmountable obstacle: ‘I cannot comprehend’, Hyde wrote to Mordaunt, ‘why Thurloe and even his master St.John should not be very ready to dispose Cromwell to join with the King, and why they should not reasonably promise themselves more particular advantages from thence, than from anything else that is like to fall out?’
Nevertheless, Hyde continued to hope the monarchical Cromwellians would choose to align with the royalists, unable to believe they could reconcile themselves to, or be acceptable to, a republican regime. ‘Nor is it possible’, Hyde wrote in March 1659, ‘that St.John can ever find his account with the Republican party. I know the man very well, and the part he hath had throughout those troubles, yet methinks it should not be impossible to persuade him, that he might find most security and most advantage by serving the King’.
As Andrew Barclay observes, ‘Broghill, Montagu and Wolseley were the next generation, all at least 20 years younger than Oliver, and so closer in age to the Cromwell sons. These were the men to perpetuate the rule of the Cromwells after Cromwell himself was dead’.
This is what the monarchical Cromwellians attempted to do, not only during Richard’s rule, but also for many months afterwards. Their strong support for Richard is a key aspect of the recent reassessment of Richard’s Protectorate by Jason Peacey, Peter Gaunt, David L. Smith and Patrick Little in particular. They suggest Richard’s Protectorate was more viable than its detractors have suggested: His personal qualities helped build a broader base of support amongst those who could not support his father.
Contemporary evidence points to Richard’s reliance on the monarchical Cromwellians – and on Thurloe, Pierrepoint and St.John in particular – who assume more importance in this new analysis. Hyde’s focus on this triumvirate supports this view.
The viability of restoring Richard Cromwell to power complicated the options open to the monarchical Cromwellians at the fall of the Protectorate in the spring of 1659.
Richard Ollard thinks the choice was simple: a Cromwellian who had become a Cromwellian in order to re-introduce the monarchical element into the constitution had a clear choice between restoring either Richard or Charles Stuart. Alternative military candidates like Lambert or Monck entailed a military coup d’état setting a bad precedent and that was an anathema to the civilian principles of the monarchical Cromwellians.
The reality of political life was more complicated: Circumstances had placed each man in a unique position, with different balances of responsibilities, expectations and opportunities, and they responded to these pressures.
At one end of the spectrum, Montagu and Broghill kept a safe distance from the new republican regime, having officially accepted its rule; at the other, St.John, Whitelocke and later Thurloe remained in London and worked with the republican regimes.
While this seems contradictory, it is understandable when personal and professional situations are considered, and placed in a wider conmtext of how allegiance were seen at the time.
Most of the Cromwellians who distanced themselves from the new regime were men of private means, able to retire to country estates or military postings, like Broghill and Montagu. Those who worked with the republican regime were based in London and relied on the continuation of their professional legal practices. Of these, St.John and Whitelocke believed they had a duty to preserve and continue the rule of law, necessitating some cooperation with the de facto government; an attitude they later relied on in their defenses at the Restoration.
This article considers the attempts made by Hyde and his agents to secure ‘the Monarchical party’ to the royalist cause in the year preceding the Restoration of Charles II in May 1660, and the decisions their Cromwellian targets made in response to these overtures.
In this ‘age of conscience’, such choices came at enormous personal and political cost – something acknowledged by Hyde as much as the Cromwellians themselves – and they reveal much of both the balance and the perception of political power in this turbulent year.
The ‘Monarchical party’ supported Richard Cromwell as his closest civilian advisers. These men were identified by contemporaries and subsequently examined by historians as a loose political grouping.
While accounts of the group’s make-up differ, there is a strong case for identifying them as: Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill; Oliver St.John; William Pierrepoint; Bulstrode Whitelocke; Edward Montagu; Charles Wolseley; Nathaniel Fiennes; John Glynne and Philip Jones.
David L. Smith and Patrick Little have identified these men, along with John Claypole, as the ‘leading civilian courtiers’ of the Protectorate.
Gerald Aylmer adds John Thurloe, Henry Cromwell and Gen. George Monck to be considered as allied to this group, and Hyde and his informers certainly considered each as central to a successful restoration of the monarchy.
This group has been described variously as a ‘court party’, a ‘kingship party’ or as ‘new Cromwellians’ or ‘conservative Cromwellians’.
It seems most apt, particularly in the context of their labelling as the ‘Monarchical party’ by Hyde’s informant, to refer to them here as ‘monarchical Cromwellians’. This description captures the essential features common to the men (and deemed most notable to their royalist observers), namely, their principled adherence to a monarchical settlement and personal allegiance to the Cromwell family.
Hyde recognized the unifying effect the offer of the crown to Oliver Cromwell had upon these politicians, observing years later: ‘This proposition found a marvelous concurrence; and very many who used not to agree in anything else were of one mind in this, and would presently vote him [Oliver Cromwell] king’.
The monarchical Cromwellians thrived under the Protectorate, rising to positions on the Council of State, important military and administrative postings, and with many ennobled to the Other House.
While it is accepted they were loyal to Oliver Cromwell, a re-examination of contemporary sources, in particular Peter Gaunt’s edition of the Henry Cromwell correspondence, demonstrates their equally close and developing relationships with his sons, Richard and Henry.
Political chaos followed the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658. His successor as Lord Protector, his son Richard, was not able to manage the Parliament he summoned in January 1659, or the Army leaders on whose support he relied. He was forced to resign, and thereby to abolish the Protectorate and hand power to the remnants of the old Rump, in May 1659.
For an understanding of the politics behind Richard Cromwell's hold on the Protectorate, and what motivated men like Adm. Edward Montagu, Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, Oliver St.John, Bulstrode Whitelocke, John Thurloe, Gen. George Monck and Philip Jones to risk all in early 1660 to bring about the Restoration, I found: "Monarchical Cromwellians and the Restoration," by Dr. Miranda Malins, as published on The Cromwell Association blog: https://www.olivercromwell.org/wo…
[SDS NOTE: Dr. Malins only refers to one Montagu throughout, who I think refers to Adm. Edward, and not Gen. Edward, 2nd Earl of Manchester. I don’t see any obvious confusions between the 2 men, but why she ignores Manchester’s contributions, I don’t know. If she ignores him, who else is missing? I did lightly edit it for clarity.]
For the politicians who sought to make Oliver Cromwell king and supported his son, Richard, as Lord Protector, the collapse of the Protectorate in May 1659 was a unilateral disaster.
These monarchical Cromwellians had invested more in the Protectorate than in any previous political regime, seeing in it the greatest chance to realize the moderate monarchical settlement they craved safe in the hands of their great friend and ally, Cromwell. Their admiration for and loyalty to Cromwell and his sons Richard and Henry was total, and with the family’s fall in 1659, these monarchical Cromwellians faced a multitude of dangerous and complex choices which would determine the course of the rest of their lives.
For the exiled Stuart court, the failure of the Protectorate represented a great opportunity to build a consensus for the restoration of Charles II. The court, particularly Chancellor Edward Hyde and his agents, watched and courted the monarchical Cromwellians, believing them to be the most useful converts to the royalist cause through whom the Stuart restoration might be achieved.
Lord Culpeper [SDS: Sir John, Lord Culpepper of Thoresway?] best expressed this in a letter to Hyde in June 1659 when he explained his hopes of: ‘uniting to the King’s party all the Monarchical party that looked upon Cromwell as the fittest person to attain their ends by. Their golden calf is now fallen, they can no more hope in him, neither will they depart from their Monarchical principles, they will not (I cannot fear it) submit to this rascally crew, and more so, see they cannot possibly set up any other besides the right owner’.
RLB and Tonyel: Good solution, RLB. And it explains why Quarter Day settlements were important.
In three month's time, Secretary Nicholas and Goldsmith Backwell would have numerous exchanges. When they settled up, the difference could be a few pounds either way. Or a lot -- which they could agree to carry forward, or the creditor could demand payment in full or in part. Or settle up by the exchange of a horse or a house, etc.
This article says umbrellas and parasols had Roman Catholic connotations, so maybe that had something to do with it? I think the design, weight and size was the umbrella's downfall. London was a crowded city, so if you went out in the rain, carrying a wood- or metal-framed personal cover on crowded sidewalks, you would be very unpopular, plus it would make you a target for rogues as it would be carried in your sword hand -- and make you off-balance.
Plus they had all those buildings where the sidewalk was somewhat protected by the first floor of the house protuding out several feet, so people could shelter there.
"By the middle ages, the umbrella was popular in Asia and Africa, but not so much on the Continent. Perhaps this is because it was an important part of the regalia of the Roman Catholic Church, and therefore laymen were reluctant to adopt it because of its importance in religious ceremonies.
"It wasn't until the early 16th century that the umbrella was used as a fashionable novelty as well as a religious object. Its popularity began in Portugal after colonists reported their use in Asia and Africa. The custom spread to France (Catherine de Medici brought a parasol with her to France to marry the Duke of Orleans) and England (Mary Queen of Scots owned a parasol of crimson satin trimmed with gold tassels). Parasols were also used in hunting expeditions in France, but more for the wealthy than the commoner.
"As travelers returned to England from abroad, the umbrella was slowly introduced to citizens. Although Catherine of Braganza (wife of Charles II) brought an umbrella with her from Portugal, it wasn't until the late 1600s the waterproof umbrella came into its own in England. Until now, people scurried for cover when it began to rain.
"Both walking gentry and working-class citizens used waterproof umbrellas, although they were more common among women than men. Men relied more on the surtout (a long, loose overcoat) when it rained. By this time, the umbrella was also being used and advertised as a sunshade. A Paris manufacturer even had a folding model for the pocket. The parasol provided a welcome alternative to protection from the sun than the veils and masks then in use.
"Although it was becoming more popular, it wasn't a common sight in Britain until the last half of the 18th century, as it was cumbersome and heavy. As designs improved, so did use." http://www.literary-liaisons.com/…
NOTE: the people cited as using them would have had others hold them -- or they would not be required to carry anything else. Umbrellas and parasols were impractical for everyday people trying to do something.
Comments
Third Reading
About Nathaniel Fiennes
San Diego Sarah • Link
Nathaniel Fiennes MP was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II.
For an understanding of why Fiennes did not find favor after the Restoration, see
https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
About Roger Boyle (Baron Broghill, Earl of Orrery)
San Diego Sarah • Link
Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II.
For an understanding of how Broghill played his cards and found favor and advancement after that Restoration, see
https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
About Oliver St John
San Diego Sarah • Link
Chief Justice Oliver St.John was one of the critical and influential "monarchical Cromwellians" who, in 1659, Hyde believed could be influenced into supporting the restoration of Charles II.
For an understanding of why St.John did not find favor after that Restoration, see
https://www.pepysdiary.com/encycl…
About Friday 6 July 1660
San Diego Sarah • Link
"No, Kevin Peter, this was Charles II's first outing as a healer."
What was I thinking? Maybe it was Charles' first time IN ENGLAND. He has been a bit busy. Also minting all those gold Angels might have been a challenge.
"... did SP missed this piece of popish (laying of hands) history."
And yes, Vincent, Pepys didn't record that and nearly everything else the Stuart brothers were up to at this time -- he's too consumed by his own concerns and activities to be a Royalty follower as well.
We have to leave that up to Evelyn, who is still a smitten Monarchist at this time.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 14
When Charles II was restored on 8 May, it was done easily and unconditionally. Most of the monarchical Cromwellians had accepted the idea of the Stuart restoration, and had influenced it.
This acceptance represented more of a pragmatic resignation than an ideological commitment, even on the part of those who corresponded with Charles.
Their experience of the civil wars had left them with a mistrust of kingship, and their admiration of Oliver Cromwell left them with high expectations of a monarch grounded in superior behavior, not a divine right to rule.
As Montagu observed: … the King would not last long ‘unless he carry himself very soberly and well’.
Examining the monarchical Cromwellians’ relationship with the exiled court reveals some conclusions:
It reinforces the monarchical Cromwellians’ position at the center of government and their influence, particularly under the Protectorate.
Hyde’s instructions reveal the importance he placed on securing them to the royalist cause, while his agents’ obsession with St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint rescued them from the obscurity into which their own attempts to distance themselves from the Protectorate at the Restoration cast them.
"Whitewashing" disguised the monarchical Cromwellians’ commitment to the Protectorate and to the Cromwell family -– made possible only by Richard’s actions releasing them from their bond to him -– and by Hyde and Charles II’s acknowledgement of their former loyalty.
The key to many of the monarchical Cromwellians’ views was their desire for a monarchical settlement, and this made them willing converts to the King’s cause. The finer points of their conversion –- its tone and timing -– cast long shadows over their future careers.
Those, like Montagu, Monck and Broghill, who negotiated their relationship with the exiled court well, enjoyed royal favor, while those who, like Thurloe, St.John and Pierrepoint, resisted the Restoration for too long never regained their public positions.
Age and utility may have also played a part, with the younger members able to distance themselves from the civil wars, and to promise decades of loyal service to the new King than their older colleagues.
The range of success with which the monarchical Cromwellians’ loyal submissions were received at the Restoration reflected the royalists’ dealings with them during the preceding year.
Those Cromwellians whom the exiled court found as hostile obstacles to the Restoration were damaged for life.
‘Without doubt’, an agent wrote to Hyde of St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint on 13 May 1660, ‘there are not in nature 3 such beasts, from whose villainy and treachery I beseech God defend His Majesty’.
The contrast between this vitriol and Hyde’s desires a year earlier that his agents secure the services of these same men, shows the price the monarchical Cromwellians paid for the choices they made in those 12 months.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 13
It was not for nothing that another informant declared St.John to be ‘the most deadly enemy the King has in England’.
It was unfortunate for St.John that his actions were so closely watched as he was not the only monarchical Cromwellian working to prevent a Stuart restoration.
Broghill, while corresponding with the royal court on the one hand, continued ostensibly to work with Thurloe against a royal return until late April.
He wrote to the Secretary, partially in code, assuring him: ‘They have had odd plots 6 29 32 40 39 6 here concerning the king, and all means used to win me; and thos failinge, other things were thought on; but I can assure you, I has intirely secured Munster 38 17 16 5 81 against any, that shall be for the king, or not for the council of state or parliament’.58
58 Lord Broghill to John Thurloe, 24 April 1660, in A collection of the state papers of John Thurloe, Esq; secretary, first, to the Council of State, and afterwards to the two Protectors, Oliver and Richard Cromwell, ed. T. Birch (7 vols., 1742), VII, 908. There is no evidence anyone has broken this cipher yet.
By this stage, what the monarchical Cromwellians feared most was that Monck would restore Charles II without sufficient conditions.
Whitelocke was one of the first to guess Monck’s true intentions and it was because of this that he urged Charles Fleetwood either to bid to control the King’s restoration or else to oppose it militarily.
When Fleetwood eventually refused to do either, Whitelocke rightly observed: ‘… you will ruin yourself and your friends’.
Broghill expressed similar concerns to Thurloe, writing: ‘We all hope thosE precious rights we have so long, and we think justly contended for, will not be exposed, but provided for’.
Montagu, for his part, entertained suspicions that Monck was aiming at his own dictatorship.
Hyde refused to believe that Monck’s colleagues had guessed Monck’s true intentions: ‘It is not possible that Pierpoint and St.John would be so impertinently violent against the King, if they believed Monck would ever be wrought over to him’.
Generally, Hyde’s informants were unconcerned, as one wrote: ‘Thurloe is not much in use, and his good old Master [Oliver St.John], after his lost hopes, is returned to keep his cushion till Wednesday morning. Pierpoint is still inveterate’.
These observers were proved right.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 12
Montagu certainly knew about the plan, for he confided in Pepys ‘that there was great endeavors to bring in the Protector again’.
However, the fact that Montagu told Pepys that he thought the enterprise unlikely to succeed suggests that he was not involved in the plot.
This is the most convincing piece of evidence to suggest that the other monarchical Cromwellians were launching a last-ditch attempt to restore Richard.
Rumors were circulated widely, as Pepys recounted aboard Montagu’s flagship 4 days earlier: ‘Great is the talk of a single person, and that it would now be Charles, George or Richard again. For the last of which, my Lord St.Johns is said to speak high’.
Montagu’s prediction proved right, and the plan to restore Richard came to nothing. Most Cromwellians soon abandoned the plot, as Hyde heard on 9 March: ‘Last week there was great caballing to bring in Dick Cromwell by Thurloe, St.John, Montagu, & others, but that design proving too weak, St.John and Thurloe have this week assisted the Rump in formenting discontents amongst the Officers of the Army’.
Of all the monarchical Cromwellians, St.John seems to have been the most trenchant in his opposition to a Stuart restoration. While exploring the potential for Richard’s restoration in private, he worked tirelessly to safeguard the Commonwealth.
St.John displayed his true feelings at the turbulent first meeting of the new Council of State where Hyde’s informant told Hyde that ‘St.Johns and his party [are] for anything or person to be sett up but ye king’.
St.John was powerless to prevent the Restoration, and when his arguments fell on deaf ears he withdrew from the Council, speaking angrily of Monck’s conversion to the royal cause ‘that nothing troubled him more then that Monck was a Rigid Chavaleere, both he and his man Thurloe are oul at heels’.
Thurloe then was equally powerless.
In resisting the Restoration so passionately, St.John continued to confound all of Hyde’s expectations. His reasons for resisting the Restoration are likely to have been complex. He had always desired a monarchical settlement, but his personal hostility to the Stuart dynasty had a long history . The hostility was mutual. Over the months, Hyde received hysterical reports of St.John’s – and naturally Thurloe’s – activities in the most colorful language: ‘Thurloe is semper idem; but I hope his horns will never grow so long as formerly to push the King’s friends St.John is a great pike that’s loath to be beaten into the net. He & Thurloe have been labouring of late to blow up the sectarys and discontented officers, but I hope it will come to nothing’.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 11
Once he had written this, Montagu considered himself bound in honor to Charles and it was on the following day that Pepys first noted Montagu’s having a ‘mind clear to bring in the king’.
Six days later Montagu told Pepys ‘his thoughts that the King would carry it, and that he did think himself very happy that he was now at sea, as well for his own sake as that he thought he might do his country some service in keeping things quiet’.
On 3 May, Montagu declared for Charles II and revealed to Pepys that ‘there hath been many letters sped between them for a great while’.
These successes boosted the royalists’ confidence to the point where they began to wonder why some other Cromwellians had not made contact. As Hyde wrote of Broghill: ‘… if Lord Broghill had that zeal of the King’s service, which some of his friends think him to have, or that entire confidence in Ned Villiers that he imagines, sure he would have sent an express to him in all this time, and not expected one from him’.
Despite Hyde’s anxieties, his informants continued to believe Broghill loyal, although they could only speculate as he still refused to speak openly of his commitment. Thus Hyde received word on 16 March: ‘No letters from Ireland these last two posts: Jones, Coote, and Broughill, are the chief actors there. Soe far as we understand they are all there disposed for the King’.
This silence may be explained by the pragmatism of the monarchical Cromwellians, many of whom continued to keep their options open.
This is not to say the information Hyde received of their genuine interest in his cause was inaccurate –- it did have its attractions for them –- but to suggest they continued to explore other alternative courses of action; courses available to them only as long as they did not commit themselves fully and openly to one cause.
As set out above, reports reached Hyde as late as March 1660 that some monarchical Cromwellians were exploring a final attempt to restore Richard Cromwell.
Hyde would not believe this of his favorite Montagu, writing: ‘… some would persuade us that he [Montagu] is most desirous to set up Richard again, which is so ridiculous that I cannot believe it. I wish you would say somewhat to me of him, and whether he be again to go to sea’.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 10
Thurloe made his move some time after resuming office. The evidence of Richard Willis (the double agent who served both Thurloe and Hyde), suggesting that Thurloe may have been in contact with the court the previous year, but Willis’ account must be regarded with caution as he used it to defend his traitorous behavior after the Restoration.
Thurloe certainly contacted Hyde in the spring of 1660, as Hyde told Sir John Grenville on 13 April that he had received overtures from him. He remained cautious, and would not submit any commitment in writing.
Hyde and Charles observed Thurloe’s apprehension with less sympathy than they accorded to Montagu. While they accepted Montagu’s reluctance to commit to their cause, they did not doubt his wish to do so. Regardless of his silence, they remained convinced of Montagu’s loyalty and were delighted when he appeared to have changed his mind about supporting Charles’ restoration.
It seems likely that Montagu was one of the first to come to the private decision that Charles II’s restoration would be the best available outcome, as reported by a royal agent: ‘Montagu has absolutely forsaken Thurloe, St.John and all that Cabal, and doth now wholly cleave to his father-in-law and his Party’.
Furthermore, the source reported Montagu to have said to a mutual friend that ‘the true reason why I left the one, and cleave to the other, is, because I plainly see, there is an utter impossibility of settlement without bringing in the King; and I professe, I had rather the Nation were settled, though I and my whole Family suffer by it, as I know I shall’.
Montagu’s tone seems more resigned than fervent; his acceptance of this course was a pragmatic rather than an ideological decision.
Montagu was careful to hold out as long as possible before agreeing to support Charles II and, when he did so, to keep his support utterly secret.
We know from the Clarendon State Papers that Montagu was in contact with Charles in April 1660 through the mediation of a relation.
Charles assured Montagu that he understood the delicate nature of his position: ‘I know too well the use you may be of to me in a good conjuncture, to expose you unnecessarily, and in an unfit season; therefore all that I desire of you is that you will give me your word, that you do and will take my business to heart’.
Charles promised Montagu not ‘to say anything of what hath been done in former times, in which I know well by what reasons and authority you were led, and I do assure you I am so far from remembering any thing to your disadvantage, that I look upon you as a person to be rewarded’.
Montagu was persuaded by this letter to respond favorably to Charles’ overtures on 10 April, 1660, assuring Charles that ‘I am unalterably a most dutiful subject and faithful servant of yours to the uttermost of my power’, adding that ‘the resolution I have fixedly taken, and shall never be cancelled’.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 9
When Amb. Bordeaux had an audience with Nathaniel Fiennes ‘in order to ascertain whether any hope remained for the Protector’, he learned that Fiennes ‘blames his [Richard’s] conduct and compares it to that of Rehoboam’.
(Rehoboam, the son of Solomon who reigned after his father’s death, went against the counsel of his older advisers and increased the taxes upon his subjects who rebelled as a result and created the new Israel.) This suggests Fiennes also blamed Richard for ignoring the advice of his closest civilian advisers inherited from his father -– the monarchical Cromwellians.
Taken together, these considerations eased the monarchical Cromwellians’ consciences as they looked beyond the Cromwell family for other options available to them. It was natural for them to brood over such a ‘case of conscience’, surrounded as they were by debate everywhere: in the privacy of men’s homes, at the universities, and in the press.
Their need to reconcile themselves to such actions echoes through their later writings, but they also made their justifications clear at the time. On 16 December, 1659, the Secretary of the Sealed Knot, Allen Brodrick, reported that Monck had explained: ‘Richard Cromwell forsook himself else had I never failed my promise to his Father, or regard to his memory’.
Montagu agreed, as a Hyde informant reported: ‘[Montagu] told me lately in private … as others had accused him for treating with the King, & the like, but he valued his Honour more than all that Family; But if Richard had not so foolishly broken his Parliament both he & Monck would have stood by him; And this, so far as I know, is his true sence’.
Whitelocke also used this rational to Richard’s fall in his explanation to Broghill of his decision to work with the de facto military authorities in October 1659: ‘Whitelocke had resolved in his mind the present state of affairs, that there was no visible authority or power for government at this time, but that of the Army’.
The reasoning that in Richard’s absence they were absolved from their ties to him -– almost universal among the monarchical Cromwellians -– explains how, once the time was right, they felt able to respond to the royalist courtship.
Discussions between the exiled court and the monarchial Cromwellians really began in the early months of 1660.
Once the Rump had reassembled in December 1659 and, with Monck’s march to London and the return of the secluded members in February, those Cromwellians who had stayed away during the Republican interlude returned to London with renewed confidence:
Thurloe was reinstated as Secretary of State in February;
Montagu and Broghill returned to Parliament, Broghill as a Commissioner to rule Ireland;
Pierrepoint and Montagu joined the Council of State;
and Monck and Montagu became joint Generals at Sea.
From this power base the monarchical Cromwellians began to reassess their relationships with the exiled court.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 8
Another agent wrote on 3 March 1660 that: ‘This is the first night that Thurloe sits in the Councel as Secretary of State: He, St.John, Montagu, and that Cabal have been of late finding a way to let Dick Cromwell in again’.
Montagu told Pepys 3 days later that ‘there was great endeavours to bring in the Protector again’. He went on to comment that ‘he did not believe it would last long if he were brought in’.
We do not know how long individual monarchical Cromwellians worked for Richard’s restitution. What can be understood is their feelings towards Richard and the Protectorate that had turned to dust in their hands.
The evidence above leaves little doubt that Richard’s Protectorate was the monarchical Cromwellians’ regime of choice. It was their strong commitment to both the Cromwell family and the Protectorate which fueled their efforts to prevent its collapse, their expressions of grief when it did so, and their continued desire for Richard’s return.
As Thurloe wrote to William Lockhart on Richard’s abdication in May 1659: ‘How this change doth afflict all of us here who had the honour to be related both to his Father and himself I need not trouble your Excellency with. I am in so much confusion that I can scarce constrain myself to write about it’.
However, the monarchical Cromwellians’ support for Richard diminished as the months wore on after his abdication. This did not represent a cooling in their affections for him and his family, but instead a lessening of their belief in his capabilities and in their ability to restore him (as evidenced in Thurloe’s reluctant negotiations with Amb. Bordeaux).
This accords with the pragmatism this group of politicians displayed throughout their political careers and which led at various points to their castigation as self-interested time-servers. There was also a strong sense among some of the monarchical Cromwellians that Richard had also failed to prevent his own fall.
After the Restoration, Montagu told Pepys ‘of the simplicity of the Protector in his losing all that his father had left him’. Montagu blamed Richard’s failure to listen to the counsel of the monarchical Cromwellians.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 7
Hyde understood the monarchical Cromwellians would need a great deal of reassurance that Charles II would treat them kindly and reward them for their help in recognition of the great risks they would take on his behalf.
Despite this conciliatory attitude, correspondence with the exiled court remained one-sided and nothing came of Hyde’s agents’ negotiations.
In the summer of 1659, Hyde received a series of disappointing reports describing an apparent resurgence in Fifth Monarchism, Richard Cromwell’s diminishing importance and the monarchical Cromwellians’ withdrawal from the center of power.
Hyde made a final attempt to woo Richard in July, but his emissaries drew a blank when they visited him.
Hyde’s agents suggested St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint were opposed to such an alliance which, if true, may suggest they continued to believe Richard’s cause was salvageable and doubted they could ensure Charles' restored with appropriate conditions and safeguards for themselves or for the nation. Even if Hyde promised indemnity to them, he could not guarantee what a restored Long Parliament might choose to do.
It seems the monarchical Cromwellians continued to explore the viability of restoring Richard Cromwell for some time after his fall.
Both Hyde and the French ambassador Bordeaux reported these activities. The ambassador's correspondence records a series of negotiations between Bordeaux, Thurloe and Fiennes in May and June, 1659.
Acting on behalf of Cardinal Mazarin, Amb. Bordeaux initially approached Thurloe to pledge the support of French troops to restore Richard.
Thurloe was unsure whether Richard had fallen too far into disgrace for his restoration to be achievable, and had misgivings about the consequences of failure.
The ambassador wrote that the Secretary agreed ‘that it would be an undertaking which would lead to his total ruin and to the ruin of his friends, and which might also be prejudicial to France, were it not successful’.
This came to nothing, with Nathaniel Fiennes explaining later that Thurloe ‘was not a man to enter into any warlike designs, and that as Divine Providence had seen fit thus to dispose of the government of England, no other course remained open but submission’.
This account affords a glimpse into the precarious position in which Thurloe and his fellow monarchical Cromwellians found themselves. The restoration of Richard would undoubtedly have been the most desirable eventuality for them, and yet it was a considerable risk.
Reports of these designs reached Hyde as late as March 1660. ‘Various are the opinions, even of the wisest men’, wrote one informant, ‘whether there be not a combination between St.John, Pierpoint, Thurloe, Montagu, Phil Jones and others, to reinvest Richard Cromwell’.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 6
Next Hyde targeted Cromwellians who held strategic military posts around the British Isles, including Henry Cromwell, Monck, Montagu and Broghill.
In a letter of June 1659, he set out his interpretation of their reluctant acceptance of the republican regime, and hopes for their conversion: “Truly if with reason and honesty we consult both [Henry and Monck], their best game lies that way: for neither upon their own score can keep possession, and by a submission here, both lost; which by a compliance with the right owner what hath power to make good what he promiseth a preservation to them selfs and their alliance may be obtained: The like game may Montagu play, beinge in the same predicament; which is feared all three will do; then assuredly our Idol, The good old cause falls eternally.”
Montagu was a focus for Hyde’s hopes, and he was approached as early as May 1659 with a letter from Charles II. In this, Charles wooed Montagu, writing: ‘it is very long since I have promised myself your intire affection and all the offices you can performe towards the restoring me to what is my right, and your Country to the happinesse it hath been so long deprived of’
Hyde approached Broghill through his agent, “Ned” Villiers, whom he told that the ‘King looks upon Lord Broghill as a person who may be most instrumental to do him service there, and he does not believe he will have any adverseness to it when the season shall be proper’.
On 20 June, 1659, Villiers was instructed that ‘the King very much desires… that you would haste into Ireland, and that you would assure Lord Broghill of all that he can wish for from the King, if he will perform this service’.
Charles Wolseley was another target: ‘If Sir Charles Wolseley be disposed’, Hyde wrote, ‘he can easily possess Stafford, which is no ill post, he may very securely depend upon his Majesty’.
In every case, Hyde’s correspondence reveals the understanding and sympathy he and his agents felt for the monarchical Cromwellians’ quandary.
In Montagu’s case, Hyde wrote years later of how Cromwell had charmed Montagu into his service and of how Montagu had been, understandably, ‘passionately adhered’ to him.
Hyde’s informants, working on Montagu, recognized this and also understood that Montagu had responsibilities at home; a great stake to be lost should he gamble on a Stuart restoration and lose.
As Samuel Morland wrote to Charles II on 15 June, 1659, ‘having understood your Matys great desire that Gratt: Montagu should quit that Jewish Party to wch he hath so long adhered, & become at length a faithfull & loyal subject’: “… he was wholly devoted to old Noll -– his countryman, & for his sake a great lover of all his family, but a perfect hater of the men yt now rule, as he has often told me privately … the trueth is he hath left behind him a very good stake; 2,000/, per annum, with a wife & 10 small children, & it’s no small matter will reward him for such a loss.”
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 5
To Hyde, St.John’s conversion was essential: ‘St.John is so considerable that I wish him well disposed’.
Often in Hyde’s correspondence, the triumvirate of St.John, Thurloe and Pierrepoint are given significance and influence.
As Hyde explained, he expected St.John, once he realized the ‘necessary of calling in the King’ to ‘press that all should be settled upon the old foundation… especially if he can draw his friends Pierpoint and Thurloe to the same concurrence, who have enough manifested that they are not enemies to a single person, and they can never be secure under any other than the right one, whom they would love if they knew’.
Hyde’s network considered the 3 men as central to the government of Richard’s Protectorate. As one agent wrote, ‘the present government is managed by St.John, Peirpoint, and Thurloe; what these resolve on in their Cabal is presented to the Council, and there confirmed’ while another reported Fauconbridge [Thomas Belasyse, 1st Earl of Fauconberg?] as saying that ‘Thurloe governs Cromwell, and St.John and Pierpoint govern Thurloe’.
Once this alliance was identified as the principal obstacle to Hyde’s advances to Richard Cromwell, Hyde instructed his agents to concentrate on either securing them to the royalist cause or sabotaging their power. This manifested itself in a variety of tactics: ‘We know Pierpoint is well, and that he will never be severed from St.John’, Hyde wrote, ‘but if he were once broke, the other would look about him, indeed if those two were out of the way, Cromwell himself would quickly find the only course to preserve his family… We have taken the best care we can that Pierpoint might be better disposed; but those who know him best, dare not approach him, till the other two are humbled; therefore I pray do all that may be to prosecute Mr. Thurloe and his Master, which will produce excellent effects.'
Despite initial reports that Morduant had secured a deal with Richard, nothing came of it, possibly due to Thurloe delaying the process and Richard getting cold feet.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 4
For each man, these practical considerations were balanced by questions of conscience.
Loyalty to the Protectorate and the Cromwell family weighed heavily on their minds, and their responses to the republican regime, exiled court and later writings demonstrate the lengths they went to justify –- both to themselves and to others –- that any change in allegiance did not entail the betrayal of a prior commitment or any consequent loss of honor.
Keith Thomas captured these struggles in his description of this time as the ‘age of conscience’. … ‘there has been no period in English history when men and women were subjected to so many religious and political conflicts of duty and allegiance or responded to them in so intensely scrupulous a fashion’.
No one was more aware of this complex political and emotional landscape than Edward Hyde. Writing to an agent about their plans to convert Montagu to the royalist cause in February 1660, Hyde mused: ‘I have no better opinion of the honesty of the age than you seem to have, and do not look that conscience and repentance shall dispose men to lose all they have got, yet how to apply a general remedy to that disease is above my skill in physic’.
Although Hyde could not think of a ‘general remedy’ to the problem of how to convert their former enemies, he recognized the importance that ‘care is taken that all be said that is necessary’ to reassure potential collaborators that they would be safe from retribution.
In the months around Richard’s abdication, Hyde instructed his informants to work on the monarchical Cromwellians, seeking ways to win them over to the royalist cause.
First Hyde tried to reach a settlement with Richard Cromwell through his agent John Mordaunt but, to his surprise, the long-standing partnership of Thurloe and St.John proved an insurmountable obstacle: ‘I cannot comprehend’, Hyde wrote to Mordaunt, ‘why Thurloe and even his master St.John should not be very ready to dispose Cromwell to join with the King, and why they should not reasonably promise themselves more particular advantages from thence, than from anything else that is like to fall out?’
Nevertheless, Hyde continued to hope the monarchical Cromwellians would choose to align with the royalists, unable to believe they could reconcile themselves to, or be acceptable to, a republican regime.
‘Nor is it possible’, Hyde wrote in March 1659, ‘that St.John can ever find his account with the Republican party. I know the man very well, and the part he hath had throughout those troubles, yet methinks it should not be impossible to persuade him, that he might find most security and most advantage by serving the King’.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 3
As Andrew Barclay observes, ‘Broghill, Montagu and Wolseley were the next generation, all at least 20 years younger than Oliver, and so closer in age to the Cromwell sons. These were the men to perpetuate the rule of the Cromwells after Cromwell himself was dead’.
This is what the monarchical Cromwellians attempted to do, not only during Richard’s rule, but also for many months afterwards.
Their strong support for Richard is a key aspect of the recent reassessment of Richard’s Protectorate by Jason Peacey, Peter Gaunt, David L. Smith and Patrick Little in particular. They suggest Richard’s Protectorate was more viable than its detractors have suggested: His personal qualities helped build a broader base of support amongst those who could not support his father.
Contemporary evidence points to Richard’s reliance on the monarchical Cromwellians – and on Thurloe, Pierrepoint and St.John in particular – who assume more importance in this new analysis.
Hyde’s focus on this triumvirate supports this view.
The viability of restoring Richard Cromwell to power complicated the options open to the monarchical Cromwellians at the fall of the Protectorate in the spring of 1659.
Richard Ollard thinks the choice was simple: a Cromwellian who had become a Cromwellian in order to re-introduce the monarchical element into the constitution had a clear choice between restoring either Richard or Charles Stuart.
Alternative military candidates like Lambert or Monck entailed a military coup d’état setting a bad precedent and that was an anathema to the civilian principles of the monarchical Cromwellians.
The reality of political life was more complicated: Circumstances had placed each man in a unique position, with different balances of responsibilities, expectations and opportunities, and they responded to these pressures.
At one end of the spectrum, Montagu and Broghill kept a safe distance from the new republican regime, having officially accepted its rule; at the other, St.John, Whitelocke and later Thurloe remained in London and worked with the republican regimes.
While this seems contradictory, it is understandable when personal and professional situations are considered, and placed in a wider conmtext of how allegiance were seen at the time.
Most of the Cromwellians who distanced themselves from the new regime were men of private means, able to retire to country estates or military postings, like Broghill and Montagu.
Those who worked with the republican regime were based in London and relied on the continuation of their professional legal practices. Of these, St.John and Whitelocke believed they had a duty to preserve and continue the rule of law, necessitating some cooperation with the de facto government; an attitude they later relied on in their defenses at the Restoration.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
PART 2
This article considers the attempts made by Hyde and his agents to secure ‘the Monarchical party’ to the royalist cause in the year preceding the Restoration of Charles II in May 1660, and the decisions their Cromwellian targets made in response to these overtures.
In this ‘age of conscience’, such choices came at enormous personal and political cost – something acknowledged by Hyde as much as the Cromwellians themselves – and they reveal much of both the balance and the perception of political power in this turbulent year.
The ‘Monarchical party’ supported Richard Cromwell as his closest civilian advisers. These men were identified by contemporaries and subsequently examined by historians as a loose political grouping.
While accounts of the group’s make-up differ, there is a strong case for identifying them as: Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill; Oliver St.John; William Pierrepoint; Bulstrode Whitelocke; Edward Montagu; Charles Wolseley; Nathaniel Fiennes; John Glynne and Philip Jones.
David L. Smith and Patrick Little have identified these men, along with John Claypole, as the ‘leading civilian courtiers’ of the Protectorate.
Gerald Aylmer adds John Thurloe, Henry Cromwell and Gen. George Monck to be considered as allied to this group, and Hyde and his informers certainly considered each as central to a successful restoration of the monarchy.
This group has been described variously as a ‘court party’, a ‘kingship party’ or as ‘new Cromwellians’ or ‘conservative Cromwellians’.
It seems most apt, particularly in the context of their labelling as the ‘Monarchical party’ by Hyde’s informant, to refer to them here as ‘monarchical Cromwellians’. This description captures the essential features common to the men (and deemed most notable to their royalist observers), namely, their principled adherence to a monarchical settlement and personal allegiance to the Cromwell family.
Hyde recognized the unifying effect the offer of the crown to Oliver Cromwell had upon these politicians, observing years later: ‘This proposition found a marvelous concurrence; and very many who used not to agree in anything else were of one mind in this, and would presently vote him [Oliver Cromwell] king’.
The monarchical Cromwellians thrived under the Protectorate, rising to positions on the Council of State, important military and administrative postings, and with many ennobled to the Other House.
While it is accepted they were loyal to Oliver Cromwell, a re-examination of contemporary sources, in particular Peter Gaunt’s edition of the Henry Cromwell correspondence, demonstrates their equally close and developing relationships with his sons, Richard and Henry.
About Richard Cromwell
San Diego Sarah • Link
Political chaos followed the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658. His successor as Lord Protector, his son Richard, was not able to manage the Parliament he summoned in January 1659, or the Army leaders on whose support he relied. He was forced to resign, and thereby to abolish the Protectorate and hand power to the remnants of the old Rump, in May 1659.
For an understanding of the politics behind Richard Cromwell's hold on the Protectorate, and what motivated men like Adm. Edward Montagu, Roger Boyle, Lord Broghill, Oliver St.John, Bulstrode Whitelocke, John Thurloe, Gen. George Monck and Philip Jones to risk all in early 1660 to bring about the Restoration, I found:
"Monarchical Cromwellians and the Restoration," by Dr. Miranda Malins, as published on The Cromwell Association blog:
https://www.olivercromwell.org/wo…
[SDS NOTE: Dr. Malins only refers to one Montagu throughout, who I think refers to Adm. Edward, and not Gen. Edward, 2nd Earl of Manchester. I don’t see any obvious confusions between the 2 men, but why she ignores Manchester’s contributions, I don’t know. If she ignores him, who else is missing? I did lightly edit it for clarity.]
For the politicians who sought to make Oliver Cromwell king and supported his son, Richard, as Lord Protector, the collapse of the Protectorate in May 1659 was a unilateral disaster.
These monarchical Cromwellians had invested more in the Protectorate than in any previous political regime, seeing in it the greatest chance to realize the moderate monarchical settlement they craved safe in the hands of their great friend and ally, Cromwell. Their admiration for and loyalty to Cromwell and his sons Richard and Henry was total, and with the family’s fall in 1659, these monarchical Cromwellians faced a multitude of dangerous and complex choices which would determine the course of the rest of their lives.
For the exiled Stuart court, the failure of the Protectorate represented a great opportunity to build a consensus for the restoration of Charles II. The court, particularly Chancellor Edward Hyde and his agents, watched and courted the monarchical Cromwellians, believing them to be the most useful converts to the royalist cause through whom the Stuart restoration might be achieved.
Lord Culpeper [SDS: Sir John, Lord Culpepper of Thoresway?] best expressed this in a letter to Hyde in June 1659 when he explained his hopes of: ‘uniting to the King’s party all the Monarchical party that looked upon Cromwell as the fittest person to attain their ends by. Their golden calf is now fallen, they can no more hope in him, neither will they depart from their Monarchical principles, they will not (I cannot fear it) submit to this rascally crew, and more so, see they cannot possibly set up any other besides the right owner’.
About Wednesday 4 July 1660
San Diego Sarah • Link
RLB and Tonyel: Good solution, RLB. And it explains why Quarter Day settlements were important.
In three month's time, Secretary Nicholas and Goldsmith Backwell would have numerous exchanges. When they settled up, the difference could be a few pounds either way. Or a lot -- which they could agree to carry forward, or the creditor could demand payment in full or in part. Or settle up by the exchange of a horse or a house, etc.
The shortage of coins made people very creative.
About Thursday 5 July 1660
San Diego Sarah • Link
This article says umbrellas and parasols had Roman Catholic connotations, so maybe that had something to do with it?
I think the design, weight and size was the umbrella's downfall. London was a crowded city, so if you went out in the rain, carrying a wood- or metal-framed personal cover on crowded sidewalks, you would be very unpopular, plus it would make you a target for rogues as it would be carried in your sword hand -- and make you off-balance.
Plus they had all those buildings where the sidewalk was somewhat protected by the first floor of the house protuding out several feet, so people could shelter there.
"By the middle ages, the umbrella was popular in Asia and Africa, but not so much on the Continent. Perhaps this is because it was an important part of the regalia of the Roman Catholic Church, and therefore laymen were reluctant to adopt it because of its importance in religious ceremonies.
"It wasn't until the early 16th century that the umbrella was used as a fashionable novelty as well as a religious object. Its popularity began in Portugal after colonists reported their use in Asia and Africa. The custom spread to France (Catherine de Medici brought a parasol with her to France to marry the Duke of Orleans) and England (Mary Queen of Scots owned a parasol of crimson satin trimmed with gold tassels). Parasols were also used in hunting expeditions in France, but more for the wealthy than the commoner.
"As travelers returned to England from abroad, the umbrella was slowly introduced to citizens. Although Catherine of Braganza (wife of Charles II) brought an umbrella with her from Portugal, it wasn't until the late 1600s the waterproof umbrella came into its own in England. Until now, people scurried for cover when it began to rain.
"Both walking gentry and working-class citizens used waterproof umbrellas, although they were more common among women than men. Men relied more on the surtout (a long, loose overcoat) when it rained. By this time, the umbrella was also being used and advertised as a sunshade. A Paris manufacturer even had a folding model for the pocket. The parasol provided a welcome alternative to protection from the sun than the veils and masks then in use.
"Although it was becoming more popular, it wasn't a common sight in Britain until the last half of the 18th century, as it was cumbersome and heavy. As designs improved, so did use."
http://www.literary-liaisons.com/…
NOTE: the people cited as using them would have had others hold them -- or they would not be required to carry anything else. Umbrellas and parasols were impractical for everyday people trying to do something.